


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20 MAY 1967

The Honorable Robert S. McNamara
The Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Bob:

I have discussed your 18 May request with my staff. I agree that a study of the Soviet ability to deploy additional forces from the USSR to Central and Southern Europe should be undertaken in the light of improved evidence and US planning experience.

The intelligence community is in the midst of preparing a National Intelligence Estimate on the capabilities of Soviet and Eastern European general purpose forces. This NIE will provide a firm basis for the study of the Soviet reinforcement problem. However, the closeness of the completion date of the NIE (late September) and that suggested for your study (1 November) may not provide sufficient time for a thorough job.

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I understand that [redacted] of my staff has discussed the proposed study with Mr. Rossotti of Dr. Enthoven's office and [redacted] of DIA. I propose that we instruct them to arrange

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OSD Declassification/Release Instructions on File

31 MAY 1967

a mutually satisfactory completion date for the joint study to meet your needs.

General Carroll concurs with this proposal.

Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

Richard Helms
Director

25X1A

cc: General Carroll

CONCUR:

25X1A

[Redacted Signature]

26 MAY 1967

R. J. SMITH
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Date

EWProctor:yd (25 May 67)

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - General Carroll
- 1 - ER w/cy basic
- 1 - DCI
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - DDI w/cy basic
- (1) - ORR w/cy Basic

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Executive Registry

67-2554

DDI-1720-67

18 MAY 1967

Honorable Richard Helms
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Dick:

I am concerned that our estimates of the USSR's ability to reinforce Central and Southern Europe with forces from the USSR do not take enough account of operational problems in large-scale deployments. Experience and studies of our own deployment ability show that non-transportation time is a large part of total deployment time.

A detailed study of USSR ability to reinforce, taking account of relevant U.S. data, would be very helpful. I think it would be most useful if done jointly by CIA and DIA.

The enclosed paper outlines some important considerations which I think such a study should include. The point of contact on my staff for this study is the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), and I would appreciate it if you would keep him informed of progress and discuss with him any problems which might arise.

If necessary, the study can be written at the SI/SAO level.

I suggest a completion date for the study of November 1, 1967.

Sincerely,



Enclosure

cc: DIA

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See Def Cont Nr. X-3020

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MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS IN STUDY OF USSR REINFORCEMENT

STUDY OBJECTIVE

The overall objective is to determine a realistic deployment schedule of divisions from the USSR to East Germany and Thrace, using realistic factors for non-transportation time.

PRINCIPAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. U.S. analogs from JCS and U.S. Army studies should be the main guidance as to what is "realistic". The study should document any assumptions that the USSR can do tasks faster than the U.S. does.
2. The study should specifically consider non-divisional logistic and other support troops. This should include estimates of specific troop lists of non-divisional units required for deployment of divisions; these requirements should then be compared with actual available units. If men or equipment must be mobilized to fill these units, realistic times should be assigned to doing this. The study should support these estimates with the best available information on the Soviet's mobilization plans and programs.
3. The study should include a specific estimate of individual and unit training time for units requiring substantial increases in personnel to reach wartime strength. If training time is assumed to be less than comparable time for a U.S. unit, the study should document why this is possible.
4. The study should make a realistic estimate of the proportion of transportation capacity that can be diverted to military use. It would be useful to discuss the effect on the East European civilian economy and the willingness of these governments to support the Soviet Union. It should consider any possible fear of retaliation if they collaborated in massive military movements.
5. The study should consider how the assembly of a massive strike force in East Germany would be affected by precautions against a possible NATO tactical nuclear strike.
6. The requirement for concurrent movement of ammunition, POL and other material should be examined.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 2 May 67
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REMARKS:		
<p>ORR Distribution Made:</p> <p>1 - Ch/LRA</p> <p>1 - Ch/T/CF </p> <p style="text-align: right;">31 May 67 - mb</p> <p>1 - Ch/E, D/T, T/TR</p> <p style="text-align: right;">1 Jun 67 ajs</p>		
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(47)

PRODUCTION 577

EA/RR

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Adm
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CIA No. 4735

MEMORANDUM FOR:

25X1A

Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Assistant Director for
Intelligence Production
Defense Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20301

SUBJECT : Request for Updating of CIA Report

REFERENCE : S-4436/AP-7

1. CIA stands ready, as you request, to update estimates of the value of Soviet military and item deliveries to Eastern Europe given in CIA/RR A. ERA 65-4, December 1965. It is our present view that these estimates are somewhat high, but they continue to provide a useful indicator of the magnitude and trend of Soviet hardware shipments to Eastern Europe.

2. We will undertake first to furnish estimates for 1965 consistent with the earlier estimates. These estimates can be supplied in July. Estimates for 1966 cannot be made until we receive the Soviet foreign trade yearbook for 1966. We will supply the estimates as soon thereafter as possible, and in any case by the end of the year.

3. At some future date, CIA may publish a re-evaluation of the methods and results of CIA/RR A. ERA 65-4, in the light of additional work on Soviet and partner country trade statistics and any other new evidence available.

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WILLIAM H. MORELL, JR.
Director
Research and Reports

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25X1A

25 MAY 1967

OCh/E/RR

Approved For Release 2002/05/08 : CIA-RDP70S00385R000100280028-1

SECRET

DATE: 24 May 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Research and Reports

THRU : Chief, Economic Research Area, ORR

FROM : Chief, Communist Division

SUBJECT : DIA Request for Updating of ORR Report, CIA/RR A. ERA 65-4


1. It is proposed that ORR agree to the request from DIA for updating of estimates of Soviet military end item shipments to Eastern Europe given in CIA/RR A. ERA 65-4, December 1965, S/NFD. Attached is a draft of a memorandum for DIA to this effect.

2. Subject report proposes the hypothesis that Soviet military hardware shipments to the Eastern European countries are included in the total value of Soviet exports to those countries, as given in Soviet trade statistics. Other non-itemized exports are estimated in this report as amounting to between 1 and 3 percent of total Soviet exports to these countries. On this basis, rough estimates are made of the value of Soviet military deliveries to Eastern Europe, as a final residual in Soviet exports to these countries.

3. The hypothesis and the results obtained through its use are consistent with all our other information. The hypothesis appears to be the only plausible explanation of the sizable residuals in Soviet exports to Eastern Europe, given the almost exhaustive coverage of the itemized categories. The results yield trends and magnitudes that are reasonable in the light of observed Soviet shipments of military end items, the relative size and state of equipment of the Eastern European armed forces and their relative dependence on Soviet material, and the announced defense budgets of the Eastern European countries.

4. We have, however, concluded from further work comparing Soviet trade statistics and partner country statistics that other nonitemized Soviet exports (apart from military end items) probably account for

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more than 1-3 percent of the residuals in Soviet exports to Eastern Europe. Eventually, it may prove desirable to publish a new report, in which these findings are examined and revised estimates made of the value of Soviet military end item shipments to Eastern Europe. Such a report cannot be prepared in time to meet DIA's present request.

5. Accordingly, we have proposed, in the attached draft memorandum for DIA, that we simply update the original estimates, with a short statement of our present view about the magnitude of "other" nonitemized exports in Soviet statistics on trade with Eastern Europe. In the near future we would provide estimates for 1965. Later this year, after receiving the Soviet foreign trade yearbook for 1966, we would forward estimates for 1966.



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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

10 MAY 1967

S-4436/AP-7

SUBJECT: Update of CIA Study (U)

TO: Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
ATTN: Office of Research and Reports

1. (S) The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is frequently asked to provide estimates of the magnitude and value of military equipment shipped from one country to another. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) study, A Method of Estimating Soviet Exports of Weapons to Eastern Europe (CIA/RR A. ERA 65-4) which provides tentative estimates of the value of weapons shipped from the USSR to Eastern European Communist countries and among the latter countries on the basis of export residuals in published foreign trade statistics has proved a valuable aid in the preparation of such estimates. However, the study, which was published in December 1965, provides data only through 1964 and requires annual updating if it is to continue to maintain its value. Such an updating would be very helpful to DIA.

2. (S) It is requested that this office be informed as to whether the Office of Research and Reports has plans for, or would be willing to undertake, an annual update of its above referenced report. What is required this year is an early update to cover 1965 with an update near the end of the year to cover 1966. In subsequent years a year-end update would be needed.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

25X1A

SIGNED

[Redacted Signature Box]

Legation General, USA
Deputy Assistant Director for
Intelligence Production

1967
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Please have response prepared for my signature.											
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DATE: Approved For Release 2002/05/08 : CIA-RDP70S00385R000100280028-1
24 May 1967

INDEX:

PRODUCTION 5-7



TO: Chief, ERA
" St/CS

FROM: " St/P

D/ARR

SUMMARY:

Instructions on Sensitive Reports

DCI instructions re dissemination of papers prepared
for McNamara and Katzenbach 23 May 1967.
(Reports listed in Memo)

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